Imperial Vacuum and National Rebirth: Lithuanian Independence, 1918 (Dr Joseph Yu)

On 16th February 1918, led by Jonas Basanavičius, the Council of Lithuania signed the Act of Independence and declared independence. The First World War severely weakened the traditional European Empires: Germany was mired in economic recessions and low morale, Russia plagued with internal instability amid repeated military failures. However, their ill fate was good news to individual nations such as Lithuania, which were controlled within these vast, multiethnic empires. Encouraged by nationalistic ideas, many of them declared independence. This essay examines whether Lithuanian independence in 1918 was mainly due to external imperial collapse or whether Lithuanian political agency was equally significant. While the disintegration of imperial authority created essential structural conditions for independence, this essay argues that independence was not a direct or automatic result, but rather a result of deliberate political action by Lithuanian elites who took advantage of the imperial breakdown operating during an unstable window of opportunity.

As the dominant power across Eastern Europe and Asia, the successful Russian February and October Revolutions acted as catalyst for many independence movements, including the one in Lithuania. The Russian Empire had controlled many ethnic groups by the early 20th century, including Lithuania which had been incorporated into the Russian Empire since the partition of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1795. The Tsar often relied on coercion to enforce obedience and suppress dissidents, and policies of Russification were used to suppress local language, culture, and independence (Weeks 2018). This longstanding repression means that even though nationalism swept through Europe in the late nineteenth century, Lithuania was unable to achieve political independence. The turning point came in 1917 with the success of the Russian Revolutions. According to Balkelis (2018: 112-115), the collapse of imperial authority in the western borderlands of Russia created a power vacuum in which national movements could operate more freely. In other words, political campaigners were free from censorship and intimidation by secret police, which eventually led to the successful convention of the Vilnius Conference in September 1917. Without the collapse of effective Russian control, this would not have been possible. Nevertheless, it is important to note that collapse of Russian authority did not directly lead to independence, as the Bolsheviks’ support for national self-determination was largely strategic and at best inconsistent, especially in border regions (Balkelis 2018, pp. 118–120). Balkeli (2018) examines Lithuanian state formation within the broader context of World War I, imperial collapse, and post-war conflict. The source is relevant to the investigation as it places Lithuanian independence within a comparative and structural framework, specifically, the power vacuum created by the disintegration of both the Russian and German empires. With its extensive use of archival material and its balanced analysis, Balkelis argues that while the collapse of the Russian and German empires created the background context, it was the Lithuanian elites who exploited these contextual factors to their advantage and fought for independence. This helps the investigation avoid overestimating the role of imperial collapse. However, as a revisionist historian, Balkelis understates the importance of pre-existing, longstanding Lithuanian nationalism and the symbolic significance of the February 1918 declaration itself. Overall, it is more accurate to argue that Lithuania did not gain independence from Russia but rather because Russia had ceased to exercise effective control. This means that Russian collapse was necessary, but not the sole condition for independence.

The ill fate of Lithuania could be summarised by the famous saying that ‘when whales collide, shrimps suffer’, as although Russian collapse removed one imperial barrier, Lithuania remained under German military occupation since 1915. Similar to its Russian counterpart, German occupation restricted personal and political freedom in Lithuania, as they vied for total control and military exploitation to allow the state to focus on the ongoing war. This undermined the progress of national self-determination in the occupied territory. A witness to the Lithuanian independence movement, Pajaujis (1968) recalls how German rulers were suspicious of Lithuanian nationalist intentions, especially that, with shared Slavic ethnicity and culture, an independent Lithuania would align with Russia. At the time, Pajaujis was working at Lietuvos Aidas and was personally involved in submitting and publishing the Act of Independence under German occupation. Written 50 years later in 1968, this source is the author’s reflection and interpretation on his first-hand experience. Although at face value the purpose of the source is to commemorate the declaration of independence, its real purpose is to justify the actions of the Lithuanian Council (Taryba), emphasising Lithuanian political agency in the imperial collapse. Its tone and emphasis also suggest that it serves a political purpose in reinforcing the legitimacy of Lithuanian independence during the Cold War. The value of the source lies in its detailed first-hand insight into how the collapse of the Russian Empire removed Lithuanian ties to Russia, while Germany’s declining military position forced concessions in 1918. Through specific evidence on negotiations with German authorities, censorship, and the timing of the declaration, this source demonstrates that imperial collapse enabled, but not immediately guaranteed independence. The source also highlights the constraints imposed by German occupation, which suggest that Lithuanian independence required careful political manoeuvring rather than passive reliance on imperial decline. However, the source is limited by hindsight. Written fifty years later, it may overemphasise unity and Lithuanian intentionality while downplaying internal divisions and limited popular participation. Further, being a commemorative speech written during the Cold War, the source only shows the nationalist perspective as Pajaujis selectively portray German and Russian actions to reinforce the legitimacy of Lithuanian independence.

Nevertheless, German occupation created opportunities. Germany’s primary strategic concern was to secure influence in Eastern Europe following the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in March 1918. Lithuanian leaders exploited this uncertainty by presenting independence as compatible with German interests. Pajaujis recalls that Lithuanian elites understood Germany’s weakening position by late 1917 and deliberately timed their political actions accordingly (1968). Historian Balkelis supports this interpretation, arguing that Lithuanian independence was pursued not because Germany supported it, but because German authority was becoming increasingly unstable (2018, pp. 145–147). The weakening German war effort in 1918 reduced their ability to control, allowing Lithuanian leaders to push for formal independence. This demonstrates that German imperial decline did enable independence indirectly by reducing the effectiveness of occupation.

However, imperial collapse alone does not explain Lithuanian independence as the Lithuanians also played an important role in this process. The establishment of the Council of Lithuania (Taryba) following the Vilnius Conference illustrates how Lithuanian elites actively organised to exploit imperial weakness. According to Pajaujis, the Council deliberately framed independence in diplomatic terms to avoid provoking German repression while maintaining distance from Russian revolutionary forces (1968). The Act of Independence of 16 February 1918 was a calculated political document. It asserted full sovereignty without explicit alignment with either Germany or Russia, despite earlier drafts being pressured to include references to German protection. What distinguished Lithuania as their strong political organization, which guaranteed  the effectiveness of their independence efforts (Juskys and Zozaite, 2021, pp. 55–58). This highlights that imperial collapse alone did not guarantee success; political cohesion and strategic leadership were decisive. Nevertheless, Lithuanian agency was limited at the time as the Council only represented a narrow political elite and lacked a mass democratic mandate. In fact, many Lithuanian soldiers and civilians experienced the period after 1918 as a continuation of war rather than true liberation (Safronovas, 2021, pp. 12–15). This suggests that independence was an elite-driven, top-down process enabled by imperial collapse, rather than a broad popular revolution.

Historiographically, earlier nationalist interpretations (e.g. Pajaujis, 1968) portrayed Lithuanian independence as the culmination of a long national awakening interrupted by imperial domination. More recent scholarship, particularly Balkelis (2018), adopts a revisionist approach, emphasising contingency and instability. Balkelis argues that independence emerged from the chaotic overlap of war, revolution, and collapsing empires rather than from a linear nationalist trajectory. This revisionist view challenges commemorative accounts such as Pajaujis’s, which emphasise unity and foresight. While Pajaujis provides valuable participant insight, his narrative risks overstating intentionality and underplaying uncertainty. Senn (1994) reinforces this critique by comparing Lithuanian independence in 1918 with that of 1990, arguing that the earlier independence was far more precarious and internationally marginal (pp. 125–127). However, revisionism also has limitations. By stressing instability, historians such as Balkelis may understate the ideological continuity of Lithuanian nationalism and the symbolic importance of the February declaration. Weeks (2018) argues that nationalist networks, cultural movements, and political traditions provided essential foundations that allowed elites to act decisively once imperial collapse occurred.

The events following February 1918 further demonstrate that imperial collapse alone did not secure independence. Lithuania immediately faced military threats from Bolshevik forces, German Freikorps, and Poland. Surgailis (2014) details how independence had to be defended militarily during the Wars of Liberation between 1919 and 1920 (pp. 149–160). This reinforces the argument that independence was not guaranteed by imperial collapse but had to be actively defended and consolidated. Safronovas (2021) similarly argues that for many participants, the transition from empire to nation-state was violent and uncertain, blurring the distinction between imperial collapse and continued conflict (pp. 20–22). This further limits claims that independence was a straightforward consequence of imperial decline.

In conclusion, the collapse of the Russian and German empires was a crucial enabling factor for Lithuanian independence in 1918, but it was not the sole or decisive cause. Russian collapse removed long-standing political constraints, while German decline reduced the effectiveness of occupation and created diplomatic uncertainty. However, independence was achieved only because Lithuanian elites acted strategically within this power vacuum, organising politically, negotiating carefully, and asserting sovereignty at a moment of maximum imperial weakness. Therefore, imperial collapse should be seen as a necessary but insufficient condition for Lithuanian independence. The evidence demonstrates that independence was not inevitable; it depended on elite agency, timing, and continued struggle after 1918. Lithuanian independence emerged from the interaction between structural imperial breakdown and deliberate political action, rather than from imperial collapse alone.

References

Balkelis, T. (2018). War, revolution, and nation-making in Lithuania, 1914-1923. Oxford University Press.

Juskys, D., & Zozaite, R. (2021). Declaration of independence in 1918: A comparison of Lithuania and Belarus [PDF]. In The Scholarly Readings of Young Historians VII (pp. 53-67). https://doi.org/10.22364/jvzl.07.04

Pajaujis, J. (1968). Fiftieth anniversary of the declaration of Lithuania's independence: Recollections of a participant. Lituanus: Lithuanian Quarterly Journal of Arts and Sciences, 14(1). Lituanus Foundation, Inc.

Safronovas, V. (2021). The war is not over? On the continuity and discontinuity between the Great War and the War of Independence as experienced by the Lithuanian soldiers. Eesti Sõjaajaloo Aastaraamat / Estonian Yearbook of Military History, 11, Articles. https://doi.org/10.22601/SAA.2021.11.01

Senn, A. E. (1994). Comparing the circumstances of Lithuanian independence, 1918–1922 and 1988–1992. Journal of Baltic Studies, 25(2), 123–130. https://doi.org/10.1080/01629779400000141

Surgailis, G. (n.d.). The 1919–1920 Lithuanian War of Liberation. In G. Vitkus (Ed.), Wars of Lithuania: A systemic quantitative analysis of Lithuania's wars in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (pp. 149-222). euGrimas.

Vilkauskaite, D. O. (2013). From empire to independence: The curious case of the Baltic states 1917-1922 (Honors Scholar Theses). University of Connecticut - Storrs.

Weeks, T. R. (2018). The Lithuanian patriotic movement and independence in 1918. TILTAS – Journal of the British-Lithuanian Society, Spring/Summer, 2-5.