In recent years, political polarization has emerged as a defining characteristic of democratic societies, casting a profound impact on political discourse and social cohesion. This issue is intricately linked with patterns of media consumption, especially in the current digital age, marked by reliance on algorithm-curated, ‘instant’ media. The proliferation of partisan media outlets, the rise of social media platforms, and the growing prevalence of echo chambers have created environments where individuals are increasingly exposed to ideologically homogeneous content, reinforcing existing biases and deepening political divides.
Media Consumption
Media consumption plays a crucial role in shaping political polarization, reinforcing existing biases, and amplifying ideological divides. Fletcher & Jenkins (2019) argue that selective exposure to media content aligned with one’s political ideology strengthens attitudes in already polarized individuals (pp. 25, 31). This selective engagement suggests that not all media consumers are equally affected; individuals predisposed to strong ideological beliefs are particularly susceptible to the echo-chamber effect. Modgil et al. (2024) expand on this by highlighting how algorithm-based social media fosters confirmation bias, creating echo chambers where users are exposed predominantly to ideologically consistent content (pp. 422–423). Personalization of feeds perpetuates polarization by narrowing users' exposure to alternative viewpoints, especially during periods of heightened online activity, such as the COVID-19 pandemic.
Importantly, the regional dimension of political polarization demonstrates how media systems shape national divides. Fletcher & Jenkins (2019) note that politically motivated media consumption is more prevalent in the UK and Southern Europe than in Western and Northern Europe (p. 25), reflecting the differing roles media systems play in these regions. This observation aligns with Golder’s (2016) analysis of far-right parties in Europe, which thrive on media-driven narratives about immigration and crime (p. 15). For example, in Belgium, the Vlaams Blok gained traction as media outlets elevated concerns about immigration, creating a discursive opportunity structure that increased their salience. Media can thus legitimize specific political narratives, intensifying polarization by making certain issues, such as immigration or national security, dominant topics of public discourse.
Fringe and alternative media platforms take this process even further, catering to ideologically extreme audiences. Bjornsgaard & Dukić (2023) argue that these platforms amplify populist rhetoric and conspiracy theories, further entrenching divisions. Naushirvanov et al. (2022) corroborate this finding, showing that populist leaders exploit divisive media narratives to frame political opponents as enemies (p. 4). Such media consumption patterns exacerbate polarization not only through ideological reinforcement but also by fostering animosity and hostility between opposing groups. This phenomenon, referred to as “affective polarization,” describes the growing emotional divide between political groups, where members of one group view those in the opposing camp not only as adversaries but as enemies (Fletcher & Jenkins, 2019).
Jungkunz (2021) extends this understanding by emphasizing the emotional dimensions of media-driven polarization, highlighting how media narratives engender strong emotional attachments to in-groups and heightened hostility towards out-groups. In Germany, for example, supporters of mainstream parties exhibited significantly greater animosity toward supporters of the far-right AfD, fueled by divisive media portrayals (p. 4). Jungkunz (2021) also points out that institutional trust can mitigate these effects, with citizens exposed to cross-party collaboration being more likely to develop a “superordinate identity” that reduces intergroup hostility (p. 5). This nuanced understanding underscores the interplay between media narratives and institutional trust in shaping polarization dynamics. Collectively, these studies demonstrate how media consumption operates through multiple pathways—reinforcing ideological biases, amplifying populist rhetoric, and fostering emotional divides—thereby intensifying political polarization.
Institutional Trust
A key factor driving political polarization is institutional trust, or the lack thereof, which scholars argue contributes significantly to the growing division within societies. Fletcher & Jenkins (2019) assert that low institutional trust correlates with anti-establishment sentiments, with populist voters often gravitating toward media sources that amplify this distrust, thus reinforcing polarization (p. 36). This trend is particularly evident in countries such as Italy, the Netherlands, and the UK, where populist media outlets disproportionately thrive in regions with low institutional trust (Fletcher & Jenkins, 2019: 13, 36). Here, the media not only reflects but actively perpetuates these polarized ideologies. Modgil et al. (2024) also observe that social factors, such as age and gender, further shape individuals’ interaction with media and perceptions of institutional trust (pp. 421–423). Younger individuals, more reliant on digital and social media platforms, are more likely to be exposed to ideologically charged content, thus increasing polarization. Meanwhile, men are found to engage more with partisan content, further exacerbating divides.
The influence of economic factors on institutional trust and polarization cannot be understated. Golder (2016) suggests that economic disparity, particularly high unemployment, breeds distrust in institutions, providing fertile ground for populist rhetoric that deepens polarization (pp. 9–10). In the context of economic inequality, issues like immigration become highly politicized, exacerbating divisions between different social groups. For instance, during the COVID-19 pandemic, populist leaders deliberately undermined trust in scientific and public health institutions, fostering skepticism and further polarizing public opinion (Naushirvanov et al., 2022: 5). The rejection of expert advice during the pandemic illustrates how institutional distrust can compound ideological divides.
Conversely, Naushirvanov et al. (2022) argue that social capital and trust in community institutions play a crucial role in mitigating polarization. They suggest that high levels of social engagement foster cooperative political behavior, reducing polarization (p. 6). Jungkunz (2021) supports this idea, proposing that increased institutional trust leads to less polarization, as citizens may perceive cross-party consensus as a positive development (p. 5). This fosters a “superordinate identity,” whereby individuals, despite political differences, see collaboration as beneficial, thereby reducing affective polarization. These studies collectively underscore the central role that institutional trust plays in shaping political polarization. Social and economic factors, such as economic inequality and institutional distrust, amplify these dynamics, creating fertile ground for populist rhetoric and deepening political divides.
Social Engagement
Social engagement plays a dual role in shaping political polarization. On the one hand, it can expose individuals to diverse perspectives, potentially mitigating polarization. However, as Fletcher & Jenkins (2019) note, social engagement can also reinforce in-group homogeneity, intensifying polarization. For example, activities like volunteering can foster a sense of solidarity among like-minded individuals, deepening ideological divides (pp. 34–37). This dual effect is especially pronounced in regions with strong civic cultures, such as the UK and Italy, where ideologically polarized civic engagement has led to heightened partisan divides.
The role of media in social engagement is a crucial factor in understanding polarization. Bjornsgaard & Dukić (2023) argue that mainstream media, while not a major driver of polarization, reinforces existing beliefs among those already inclined toward extreme views. On the other hand, alternative and fringe media platforms, catering to specific ideological extremes, amplify populist sentiments and conspiracy theories, further entrenching divisions. This observation is consistent with Golder’s (2016) argument that media outlets, particularly those focused on scandalous or extreme issues, contribute to far-right rhetoric, thereby intensifying polarization (p. 15). The personalization of media content, such as through algorithm-driven social media platforms, plays a significant role in reinforcing confirmation bias and creating echo chambers, as seen in the post-COVID-19 era (Modgil et al., 2024: 422–423). The tailoring of feeds to match prior user behavior creates an echo chamber effect, where individuals are exposed primarily to viewpoints that align with their pre-existing beliefs, further amplifying polarization.
Moreover, social media platforms foster the aggregation of like-minded individuals into homogeneous networks, reinforcing polarization. Modgil et al. (2024) emphasize that this aggregation of ideologically similar individuals strengthens polarized groups, especially in fragmented political systems (p. 422). Jungkunz (2021) extends this argument by suggesting that increased trust in institutions can mitigate polarization, as citizens may view cross-party consensus as a positive development, fostering a “superordinate identity” that transcends partisan divisions. These insights suggest that social engagement, while potentially mitigating polarization, often reinforces ideological divides, particularly in environments where media consumption exacerbates polarization.
Economic Preferences
Political polarization also shapes economic preferences, with ideological divides becoming particularly pronounced during times of economic instability. Fletcher & Jenkins (2019) argue that political polarization intensifies the divergence between left-leaning individuals, who prioritize economic redistribution, and right-leaning individuals, who emphasize free-market policies (pp. 19, 23). This division becomes more pronounced in regions like Greece and the UK, where individuals form strong collective economic demands, either for redistribution or extreme liberalism (pp. 21–22). Modgil et al. (2024) highlight how algorithm-based social media exacerbates confirmation bias, reinforcing individuals’ ideologically charged preferences and contributing to deepening political divides. This is especially evident in the post-pandemic era, when increased social media use amplified polarizing narratives, creating an ‘infodemic’ that intensified ideological divisions (p. 424).
Golder (2016) underscores the role of media in amplifying polarized economic preferences, particularly in the context of far-right movements. He notes that far-right parties often exploit media coverage of issues like immigration and crime to strengthen populist narratives, framing economic issues through a divisive populist lens (p. 15). This strategy maintains polarization by appealing to different social classes while perpetuating a narrative of division between “the pure people” and “the corrupt elite.” Additionally, Golder suggests that far-right parties blend protectionist and redistributive economic policies, blurring traditional ideological boundaries and fostering polarization (pp. 9–18). Media-driven narratives, particularly in economically distressed regions, enhance the appeal of such populist rhetoric, shaping both economic preferences and political behavior.
Naushirvanov et al. (2022) further explore the relationship between polarization and economic preferences, particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic. They argue that populist leaders exacerbate polarization by framing economic issues through a partisan lens, encouraging citizens to align their economic views with their political identity (p. 7). The authors emphasize that polarization not only affects political discourse but also shapes economic policy preferences, influencing individual attitudes toward government intervention or deregulation (p. 6).
References
Bjornsgaard, K. & Dukić, S. (2023) The Media and Polarisation in Europe: Strategies for Local Practitioners to Address Problematic Reporting. European Commission. Available at: https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2021.622512.
Fletcher, R. & Jenkins, J. (2019) Polarisation and the news media in Europe: A literature review of the effect of news use on polarisation across Europe. European Parliamentary Research Service. Available at: https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2019-03/Polarisation_and_the_news_media_in_Europe.pdf.
Golder, M. (2016) 'Far Right Parties in Europe', European Journal of Political Research, 55(1), pp. 1-30. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12143.
Jungkunz, S. (2021) 'Political Polarization During the COVID-19 Pandemic', Frontiers in Political Science, 3:622512. Available at: https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2021.622512.
Modgil, S. et al. (2021) ‘A confirmation bias view on social media induced polarisation during covid-19’, Information Systems Frontiers, 26(2), pp. 417–441. doi:10.1007/s10796-021-10222-9.
Naushirvanov, T., Rosenberg, D., Sawyer, P. & Seyis, D. (2022) 'How populists fuel polarization and fail their response to COVID-19: An empirical analysis', Frontiers in Political Science, 4:948137. Available at: https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2022.948137.
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